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The original two-way continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution (CV QKD) proto-
cols [S. Pirandola, S. Mancini, S. Lloyd, and S. L. Braunstein, Nature Physics 4, 726
(2008)] give the security against the collective attack on the condition of the tomography
of the quantum channels. We propose a family of new two-way CV QKD protocols and
prove their security against collective entangling cloner attacks without the tomography
of the quantum channels. The simulation result indicates that the new protocols main-
tain the same advantage as the original two-way protocols whose tolerable excess noise
surpasses that of the one-way CV-QKD protocol. We also show that all sub-protocols
within the family have higher secret key rate and much longer transmission distance
than the one-way CV-QKD protocol for the noisy channel.
Keywords: Two-way CV QKD; collective entangling cloner attacks; security.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution is well applied to cryptography due to its unconditional
security based on quantum mechanics.1 In particular, continuous-variable quantum
key distribution (CV QKD) has attracted much attention in recent years because it
has potentially faster and more efficient detection and key rate than single-photon
QKD.2,3,4,5 One-way CV QKD allows the quantum state to pass through the
channel only from the sender (Alice) to the receiver (Bob), which brings a limitation
that the channel loss is no more than 3 dB in direct reconciliation.6 Although the
post-selection7 or the reverse reconciliation8,9 overcomes this drawback, the secret
key rate is strongly affected by excess noise.10 To enhance the tolerable excess
noise, the two-way CV-QKD protocols are proposed to go beyond the 3 dB limit
and meanwhile tolerate more excess noise than one-way protocols.10,3
The procedure of implementing the original two-way CV protocol is briefly intro-
duced below. The entanglement-based (EB) scheme of a sub-protocol in the original
two-way protocols, Het2 protocol, is shown in Fig. 1(a), and can be described as:10,3
1
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Step one. Bob initially prepares an EPR pair with variance V and keeps one
mode B1 while sending the other mode C1 to Alice through the channel where Eve
may perform her attack.
Step two. Alice encodes her information by applying a random phase-space dis-
placement operator D(α) to her received mode Ain and then sends the mode Aout
back to Bob through the channel. Note that α = (QA+ iPA)/2, and QA or PA has
a random Gaussian modulation with the variance of V − 1, respectively.
Step three. Bob measures both his original mode B1 and received mode B2 with
heterodyne detection to get the variables xB1X and pB1P as well as xB2X and pB2P ,
respectively.
Step four. Alice and Bob implement the postprocessing including reconciliation
and privacy amplification.11 In this procedure, Bob needs to combine both out-
comes from B1 and B2 to construct the optimal estimator to Alice’s corresponding
variables {QA, PA}. After the steps above, Alice and Bob can share a string of
identical key that Eve does not know.
However, to analyze the security under general collective attack, the original
two-way protocols need to construct the hybrid protocol where Alice randomly
switches between one-way (switch OFF, where Alice detects the incoming mode
and sends a new state back to Bob) and two-way schemes (switch ON) for imple-
menting the tomography of the quantum channels and for both parameter estima-
tion and key distribution,10,3 as shown in Fig.1. This hybrid scheme increases the
complexity in a real setup. Moreover, it is difficult to implement the tomography
of quantum channels in a real experiment. In this paper, we modify the original
two-way protocol by replacing the displacement operation and the ON-OFF switch
with a passive operation on Alice’s side, and give a feasible prepare-and-measure
(PM) scheme, which pushes the two-way protocol to be easily applied in practice.
Considering that Gaussian collective attack is optimal, we will prove the security
of the new protocol under collective entangling cloner attacks which are a special
case of general Gaussian collective attack thoroughly researched in Ref. 12, 13. This
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the statements of our new two-way
CV-QKD protocol. In Sec. 3, we give a theoretical analysis of the security of the
new two-way CV-QKD protocol against Gaussian collective attack by using the
optimality of Gaussian collective attack. In Sec. 4, we investigate the numerical
simulation of the secret key rate under collective entangling cloner attacks. Finally,
in Sec. 5, we conclude our results and indicate some open questions.
2. A New Two-Way CV QKD Protocol
We modify the original two-way protocols by replacing the displacement operation
and the ON-OFF switch with the passive operation on Alice’s side. The EB scheme
of Het2M protocol after modifying the Het
2 protocol is shown in Fig. 1(b). In Het2M,
the second and fourth steps of Het2 are changed into
Step two′. With using a beam splitter (transmittance: TA), Alice couples one
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mode of another EPR pair (variance: VA) with the received mode Ain from Bob
and sends the coupling mode Aout back to Bob. She also measures the other mode
A1 of this EPR pair with heterodyne detection to get the variables {xA1X , pA1P }
and randomly measures the position quadrature x or the momentum quadrature p
of the coupling mode A2 from the beam splitter with homodyne detection.
Step four′. Alice and Bob implement the postprocessing including the rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification.11 In this procedure, the homodyne detec-
tion on the mode A2 is used to estimate the channel’s parameters and Bob uses
xB = xB2X − kxB1X and pB = pB2P + kpB1P to construct the optimal estimator to
Alice’s corresponding variables {xA1X , pA1P }, where k is the channel’s total trans-
mittance which is obtained by reconciliation. The other steps of Het2M are the same
as those of Het2.
In Fig. 1(b), Alice’s beam splitter TA couples the two uncorrelated states re-
spectively from Alice and Bob. The action of the beam splitter TA is equivalent to
a unitary transformation. One output mode A2 of this beam splitter is kept and
measured on Alice’s side and the other mode Aout is sent to Bob though the chan-
nel. The effects of system parameters and environment parameters on entanglement
are discussed in detail in Ref. 14. Here the two channels affect the entanglement
degrees of those three pairs of states: B1 and A2, B1 and B2, and A1 and B2. The
effect on the channels can be ascribed to the action of Eve. Considering one-mode
Gaussian attack, the two channels can be described as two independent Gaussian-
Entangling-Cloner attacks.10 It is necessary to estimate the channel’s parameters
by the measurement values of Alice and Bob in security analysis.
The PM scheme of Het2M protocol is shown in Fig. 1(c), which is equivalent to
the EB scheme in Fig. 1(b).8 In Fig 1(c), with using the random numbers m and
n, Bob randomly modulates the amplitude (A) and the phase (φ) of the coherent
state from his laser source (LS1), and then sends the state to Alice. Alice’s laser
source (LS2) is coherent with Bob’s LS1 by phaselock and time synchronization
techniques.15 Similar to Bob’s modulation, Alice uses two other random numbers
r and s to encode information. After that, the beam splitter (transmittance: TA)
couples Alice’s signal with the signal from Bob’s side, and outputs one mode back to
Bob and another mode measured with homodyne detection. At last, the returned
mode is measured with heterodyne detection on Bob’s side. Note that the local
oscillator and the switch which randomly controls the homodyne detection to detect
the x or p quadrature are omitted for concision in Fig. 1.
In addition, the other original10 (e.g., Hom2) can be modified to new proto-
col (e.g., Hom2M) by changing the displacement into the coupling of the EPR pair,
correspondingly. According to Bob’s detection, we also propose a new sub-protocol
Hom-HetM (Het-HomM ) where Bob measures his mode B1 with homodyne (hetero-
dyne) detection and measures his mode B2 with heterodyne (homodyne) detection.
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Fig. 1. (a) The EB scheme of hybrid Het2 protocol. Bob measures one half of the EPR pair
(EPR) with heterodyne detection and sends the other half to Alice. After through the path switch
ON or OFF on Alice’s side, the back state B2 is measured with heterodyne detection. There are
two independent Gaussian-Entangling-Cloner attacks (with variancesW1 andW2) on the channels
whose transmittances are modeled by two beam splitters. The letters (e.g., B1) beside arrows: the
mode at the corresponding position; crescent: detection; the circle: new state; the dashed box at
B1 and B2: the heterodyne detection. (b) The EB scheme of Het2M protocol. It is the same as (a)
on Bob’s side. On Alice’s side, Alice measures one mode of her EPR pair (EPR′) with heterodyne
detection and measures one mode from a beam splitter with the transmittance TA by homodyne
detection. The other mode from this beam splitter is returned back to Bob. (c) The PM scheme of
Het2
M
protocol. Bob sends a coherent state to Alice, then measures the back state with heterodyne
detection to get the position (xB2X ) and the momentum (pB2P ) quadratures. Alice gets another
value xA2 by the homodyne detection. LS1 and LS2: laser source; A: amplitude modulator; φ:
phase modulator; m, n, r and s: random number generator.
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Fig. 2. The equivalent scheme to Fig. 1 (b). Bob uses two unitary transformations Γk to change
the modes B2X and B1X (B2P and B1P ) into B3 and B4 (B5 and B6), where Γk is a CV C-NOT
gate. By homodyne detection on the position (momentum) quadrature of B4 (B6), xB (pB) is
obtained. The dashed line into beam splitter: vacuum state.
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3. A Theoretical Analysis of the Security of the New Two-Way
Protocol
We consider the EB scheme of Het2M protocol in reverse reconciliation. The secret
key rate is16,17
KR = βIBA − IBE , (1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, IBA is the mutual information between Alice
and Bob, IBE is the mutual information between Eve and Bob.
According to step four′, in Fig. 1(b), IBA = log2
(
VAM /VAM |B
)
, where VAM and
VAM |B are Alice’s variance and conditional variance on Bob, respectively.9 IBA can
be obtained with Alice’s and Bob’s data. As far as IBE is concerned, according to
Holevo bound,18 we get
IBE = S(E)− S(E|xB , pB), (2)
where S(E) is Eve’s von Neumann entropy and S(E|xB , pB) is Eve’s conditional
von Neumann entropy on Bob’s data.
Because the calculation of S(E|xB , pB) relates to Bob’s postprocessing, in order
to obtain the secret key rate, Fig. 2 instead of Fig. 1(b) is used for security analysis.
In Fig. 2, Bob applies two unitary transformations Γk to the modes B2X and B1X
as well as to the modes B1P and B2P , respectively, in order to get xB (pB) by
measuring the position (momentum) quadrature of B4 (or B6). Note the order
of the transformation, e.g., (xB4 , pB4 , xB3 , pB3)
T = Γk(xB2X , pB2X , xB1X , pB1X )
T ,
where xB4 , pB4 , xB3 and pB3 are the x and p quadratures of the modes B3 and B4
and Γk is a continuous-variable C-NOT gate
19,20,21
Γk =


1 0 −k 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 k 0 1

 . (3)
Considering the assumption that Eve has no access to the interior of Bob,1 Eve
obtains the information only from Bob’s input and output. Because the unitary
transformation Γk doesn’t change the von Neumann entropy of the system
20
B2XB1XB2PB1PA2A1XA1PE and the variables xB and pB are same to both Figs.
1(b) and 2, Eve’s von Neumann entropy and conditional von Neumann entropy on
Bob in Fig. 2 are equivalent to those in Fig. 1(b). A detailed proof can be seen
in Appendix A. In addition, taking into account that IBA is the same for both
systems, the secret key rate is same to both Figs. 1(b) and 2. Thus, we use Fig. 2
to analyze the security in the following.
First, we show that the Gaussian attack is optimal to the new protocol. Accord-
ing to the step two′ and step three of the protocol Het2M, Alice and Bob measure
the mode A2 with homodyne detection and measure the modes A1, B1 and B2 with
heterodyne detection. This is equivalent to the scheme that Alice and Bob measure
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the mode A1 with heterodyne detection and measure the modes A2, B3, B4, B5
and B6 with homodyne detection in Fig. 2, i.e., Alice and Bob measure all modes
except Eve’s modes. In Fig. 2, ρE , ρB and ρA denote the states of Eve, the modes
B4B6 and the modes A2A1XA1PB3B5, respectively. It is easily seen that ψABE is
a pure state and ρAB is the purification of ρE . Because Alice and Bob’s heterodyne
or homodyne detection on their modes does not mix the x and p quadratures and
Alice and Bob use the second-order moments of the quadratures to calculate the
secret key rate bound, the new protocol can satisfy the requirement of the opti-
mality of Gaussian collective attack.20 Thus, when the corresponding covariance
matrix ΓAB of ρAB is known and fixed for Alice and Bob, the Gaussian attack is
optimal.22,23,24,25 Therefore, Eve’s accessible information can be bounded by only
considering Eve’s Gaussian collective attack. In the following part, IBE is calculated
using some ideas proposed in Ref. 26.
Second, to calculate S(E), one needs to know S(ρAB) because ψABE is a pure
state and S(E) = S(ρAB). The entropy S(ρAB) of the Gaussian state ρAB is cal-
culated according to its corresponding covariance matrix ΓAB. Note that
ΓAB = [Γk ⊕ Γk ⊕ I3] ΓB2XB1XB1PB2PA2A1XA1P [Γk ⊕ Γk ⊕ I3]T , (4)
where I3 is a 6×6 identity matrix and ΓB2XB1XB1PB2PA2A1XA1P is the corresponding
covariance matrix of the state B2XB2PB1XB1PA2A1XA1P or (seen in Appendix
B)
ΓB2XB2PB1XB1PA2A1XA1P=


γB2X I−γB2X C1 −C1 C2 C3 −C3
I−γB2X γB2P −C1 C1 −C2 −C3 C3
C1 −C1 1+V2 I 1−V2 I C4 0 0
−C1 C1 1−V2 I 1+V2 I −C4 0 0
C2 −C2 C4 −C4 γA2 C5 −C5
C3 −C3 0 0 C5 1+VA2 I 1−VA2 I
−C3 C3 0 0 −C5 1−VA2 I 1+VA2 I


, (5)
in which I is a 2 × 2 identity matrix. In Eq. (5), the diagonal elements corre-
spond to the variances of x and p quadratures of the modes B2X , B2P , B1X ,
B1P , A2, A1X and A1P in turn, e.g., γB2X = diag(〈x2B2X 〉, 〈p2B2X 〉), and the
nondiagonal elements correspond to the covariances between modes, e.g., C2 =
diag(〈xB2XxA2〉, 〈pB2X pA2〉), where xB2X , pB2X , xA2 and pA2 are the x and p
quadratures of the modes B2X and A2, respectively. In experiment, the covari-
ance matrix Eq. (5) can be calculated by the reconciliation in which Alice and Bob
reveal some randomly chosen measurement values obtained by heterodyne detection
on the modes B2, B1, A1 and homodyne detection on the mode A2. Note that the
x and p quadratures are simultaneously obtained in the heterodyne detection, but
Alice needs to randomly measure the x or p quadrature of the mode A2 to obtain
the corresponding values of the x and p quadratures of the mode A2. Therefore,
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Eve’s entropy27
S(E) =
7∑
i=1
G(λi) =
7∑
i=1
G (fλi(αmn)) , (6)
where
G(λi) =
λi + 1
2
log
λi + 1
2
− λi − 1
2
log
λi − 1
2
, (7)
and λi = fλi(αmn) is the symplectic eigenvalue of ΓAB which is the function of the
element αmn of ΓAB, seen in Appendix C.
Third, S(E|xB , pB) = S(B3B5A2A1XA1P |xB , pB) because the state
B3B5A2A1XA1PE is a pure state when Bob gets xB and pB by measuring the
modes B4 and B6. The corresponding covariance matrix Γ
xB,pB
B3B5A2A1XA1P
of the
state B3B5A2A1XA1P conditioned on xB and pB can be obtained from ΓAB
20,28
ΓxB,pBB3B5A2A1XA1P=ΓB3B5A2A1XA1P−CB4 [XxγB4Xx]MPCB4T−CB6 [XpγB6Xp]MPCB6T , (8)
where ΓB3B5A2A1XA1P , γB4 and γB6 are the corresponding reduced matrixes of
state B3B5A2A1XA1P , B4 and B6 in ΓAB, respectively, CB4 and CB6 are their
correlation matrixes, Xx = diag(1, 0), Xp = diag(0, 1) andMP denotes the inverse
on the range. Similar to Eq. (6), we obtain
S(E|xB , pB) =
5∑
i=1
G(λ′i) =
5∑
i=1
G
(
fλ′i(α
′
mn)
)
, (9)
where λ′i = fλ′i(α
′
mn) is the symplectic eigenvalue of Γ
xB ,pB
B3B5A2A1XA1P
which is the
function of the element α′mn of Γ
xB ,pB
B3B5A2A1XA1P
, seen in Appendix C.
By substituting Eqs. (6) and (9) into Eq. (1), the secret key rate is obtained
KR = β log2
VAM
VAM |B
−
7∑
i=1
G (fλi(αmn)) +
5∑
i=1
G
(
fλ′i(α
′
mn)
)
. (10)
In experiment, Alice and Bob can calculate every element of Eq. (5) according
to the measurement values of the modes B2, B1, A1 and A2, then calculate αmn
and α′mn from Eqs. (4) and (8). Therefore, according to Eq. (10), Eve’s accessible
information under Gaussian collective attacks is bounded and the secret key rate
is obtained. Similarly, the security of other sub-protocols of the new two-way CV
QKD can be analyzed.
In theory, for the security analysis, we consider collective entangling cloner at-
tacks. Collective entangling cloner attacks are a specific case of collective Gaus-
sian attacks where the communication channel is linear with transmittance T
(0 < T < 1) and thermal noise.12,13 The assumption of linear channel is often
used since the linear channel is common in real experiment and easy to be numer-
ically simulated.
To get the elements of Eq. (5) for numerical simulation, we assume that the two
channels are linear with the transmittances T1 and T2 and the noises referred to
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the input χ1 = ε1 + (1 − T1)/T1 and χ2 = ε2 + (1− T2)/T2, respectively, where ε1
and ε2 are the channel excess noises referred to the input. We can obtain
γB2X = γB2P =
1
2
{1 + T2(VA − TAVA + T1TA(V + χ1) + χ2)} I,
γA2 = [TAVA + T1(1− TA)(V + χ1)] I,
C2 =
√
1
2
T2(1− TA)TA[VA − T1(V + χ1)]I,
C1=
1
2
√
T1T2TA (V 2 − 1)σz, C3=1
2
√
T2(1−TA) (V 2A −1)σz,
C4=−
√
1
2
T1(1−TA) (V 2−1)σz, C5=
√
1
2
TA (V 2A − 1)σz , (11)
and
IBA = log2
1 + T1T2TA(1 + F ) + T2(VA − TAVA + χ2)
1 + T1T2TA(1 + F ) + T2(1 − TA + χ2) , (12)
where
F = 2V − 2
√
V 2 − 1 + χ1, σz =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (13)
Substituting above equations into Eq. (10), the secret key rate of Het2M protocol
against collective entangling cloner attacks can be obtained. Similarly, the secret key
rate of the other sub-protocols of the new two-way CV QKD can be also obtained
(seen in Appendix D).
4. Numerical Simulation and Discussion on Collective Entangling
Cloner Attacks
For simplicity in numerical simulation, we only consider for T1 = T2 and χ1 = χ2
(or ε1 = ε2 = ε). The tolerable excess noise ε can be obtained when the se-
cret key rate KR is zero. When ε, β, TA, V and VA are known, the elements of
ΓB2XB2PB1XB1PA2A1XA1P are obtained from Eq. (11). Assuming that the typical
fiber channel loss is 0.2 dB/km, with using Eq. (10), we numerically simulate ε and
KR as the functions of the transmission distance by MATLAB. For comparison, the
original Het2 protocol,10 the heterodyne protocol (Het) and the homodyne proto-
col (Hom) of one-way CV-QKD protocol5,6 are also numerically simulated in Figs.
3(a) and (b), respectively.
Fig. 3(a) shows the tolerable excess noise as a function of the transmission dis-
tance for Het2M protocol in the case that TA changes and VA = V/(1 − TA). When
choosing β = 0.99, V = 105 and TA = 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, the numerical simulation result
indicates that the tolerable excess noise of Het2M goes up with the increase of TA. V
and ε are in shot-noise units. When TA approaches 1, the Het
2
M protocol asymptot-
ically approaches the original two-way protocol Het2 whose tolerable excess noise
surpasses that of the corresponding one-way CV-QKD protocol.10 The other new
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sub-protocols also have similar numerical simulation results. Therefore, the new
protocols maintain the same advantage as the original ones.
Fig. 3(b) shows the secret key rate of all the new sub-protocols as a func-
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tion of the transmission distance for the noisy channel. Considering the practical
scheme,29,30 we choose ε = 0.2, β = 0.99, TA = 0.8 and V = VA = 100. The
simulation result indicates that all new protocols have higher secret key rate than
the one-way CV-QKD protocols. Note that the achievable transmission distance of
Hom-HetM protocol is the longest in all the new sub-protocols. The reason is that,
in Hom-HetM, Bob measures the mode B2 with heterodyne detection to get the
position and momentum quadratures, but only uses one of them for reconciliation.
This is equivalent to Bob implementing the homodyne detection with added noise.
The properly added noise is useful to enhance secret key rate.31,32,33,34
Both Fig. 4(a) and (b) show the secret key rate of the new sub-protocol Het2M
as a function of the transmission distance where TA = 0.8 and V = VA = 20. Fig.
4(a) is plotted for ε = 0.1 and β = 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7. The simulation result indicates
that the secret key rate of Het2M protocol increases with the increase of β. Fig. 4(b)
is plotted for β = 0.9 and ε = 0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05. The simulation result indicates that
the secret key rate of Het2M protocol increases with the decrease of ε.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we propose a family of new two-way CV-QKD protocols by replac-
ing the displacement operation of the original two-way CV-QKD protocols with
the passive operation on Alice’s side. By using the optimality of Gaussian attack
and the purification of the system, Eve’s accessible information is bounded by the
measurement values of Alice and Bob. The security of the new two-way CV-QKD
protocols against collective entangling cloner attacks is proved without randomly
switching between one-way and two-way schemes for the quantum-channel tomog-
raphy. Thus the PM scheme of our new protocol can be applied more practically.
The simulation result indicates that the tolerable excess noise in the new proto-
cols approaches the original ones when TA is close to 1. Even if TA and VA have
real experimental values, the new two-way CV-QKD protocols still outperform the
one-way protocols in secret key rate and transmission distance. Especially, the new
sub-protocol Hom-HetM allows the distribution of secret keys over much longer
distance than the one-way protocols. However, some open questions about the se-
curity of the new two-way CV-QKD protocols still remain. In our proof, we have
not analyzed the effects of the finite size,35,36,37 the source noise38,39,40,41 and
the detection noise16,29 on the security. Especially, it is worthwhile to further in-
vestigate the method to enhance the tolerable excess noise of CV QKD by adding
proper noise on the side of the sender or the receiver.31,32,33,34,40 These problems
will be researched in our future work.
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Appendix A. The Equivalence of Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 2 on Eve’s
Accessible Information
In Fig. 1(b), Bob calculates two variables xB = xB2X − kxB1X and pB =
pB2P + kpB1P after measuring B1X , B2X , B1P and B2P . We name it as measure-
and-calculate (MC) process. In Fig. 2, Bob measures the mode B4 (B6) to get the
variable xB4 = xB (pB6 = pB) after using two Γk on the modes B1X , B2X , B1P
and B2P . We name it as transform-and-measure (TM) process. In the following, we
prove that the two processes are equivalent for Eve’s entropy S(E) as well as con-
ditional entropy S(E|xB , pB) =
∫∞
−∞ p(xB , pB)S(ρ
xB ,pB
E )dxBdpB, where p(xB , pB)
is the probability distribution of xB and pB and ρ
xB ,pB
E is Eve’s state when Bob’s
variables xB and pB are known. We use Bo to denote B1XB2XB1PB2P ,D to denote
B3B4B5B6, and Ao to denote A1XA1PA2.
In MC process, after Bob measures B1X , B2X , B1P and B2P , the state ρAoBoE
is changed into ρAoB′oE . Thus
ρAoB′oE =
∫ ∞
−∞
FBρAoBoEFBdx1dx2dp1dp2, (A.1)
where
FB = |x1, x2, p1, p2〉Bo 〈x1, x2, p1, p2| . (A.2)
FB indicates the measurement process that obtains the corresponding eigenvalues
x1, x2, p1 and p2 of B1X , B2X , B1P and B2P .
In order to get xB = x2 − kx1 and pB = p2 + kp1, we do the parameter
transformation by replacing x2 and p2 with x2 = xB + kx1 and p2 = pB − kp1,
respectively. For the conditional state, we fix xB and pB, and denote:
ρxB ,pBAoB′oE =
∫ ∞
−∞
F ′BρAoBoEF
′
Bdx1dp1, (A.3)
where
F ′B = |+−〉Bo 〈+−|
= |x1, xB + kx1, p1, pB − kp1〉Bo〈x1, xB + kx1, p1, pB − kp1| . (A.4)
When xB and pB are known, Eve’s state is
ρxB ,pBE =
trAoB′o
(
ρxB,pBAoB′oE
)
trAoB′oE
(
ρxB,pBAoB′oE
)
=
trAo
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈x′1, x′2, p′1, p′2| ρxB ,pBAoB′oE |x
′
1, x
′
2, p
′
1, p
′
2〉Bodx′1dx′2dp′1dp′2
)
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈x′1, x′2, p′1, p′2| ρxB ,pBAoB′oE |x′1, x′2, p′1, p′2〉Bodx′1dx′2dp′1dp′2
)
=
trAo
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈+−| ρAoBoE |+−〉Bodx1dp1
)
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈+−| ρAoBoE |+−〉Bodx1dp1
) . (A.5)
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In TM process, the operation of the two unitary transformations Γk is denoted
as ST which can transform |x1, xB, p1, pB〉Bo into |x1, xB + kx1, p1, pB − kp1〉Bo .19
After implementing the two unitary transformations Γk, the original state ρAoBoE is
changed into ρAoB3B4B5B6E = SρAoBoES
T . When getting xB and pB by measuring
B4 and B6, the state is
ρxB,pBAoB3B5E = B4B6〈xB , pB|SρAoBoEST |xB, pB〉B4B6 . (A.6)
When xB and pB are known, Eve’s state is
ρ′xB ,pBE =
trAoB3B5
(
ρxB ,pBAoB3B5E
)
trAoB3B5E
(
ρxB ,pBAoB3B5E
)
=
trAo
(∫∞
−∞B3B5〈x3, p5| ρxB ,pBAoB3B5E |x3, p5〉B3B5dx3dp5
)
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞B3B5〈x3, p5| ρxB ,pBAoB3B5E |x3, p5〉B3B5dx3dp5
)
=
trAo
(∫∞
−∞D〈x3, xB , p5, pB|SρAoBoEST |x3, xB, p5, pB〉Ddx3dp5
)
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞D〈x3, xB , p5, pB|SρAoBoEST |x3, xB, p5, pB〉Ddx3dp5
)
=
trAo
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈x1, xB , p1, pB|SρAoBoEST |x1, xB, p1, pB〉Bodx1dp1
)
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈x1, xB, p1, pB|SρAoBoEST |x1, xB , p1, pB〉Bodx1dp1
)
=
trAo
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈+−| ρAoBoE |+−〉Bodx1dp1
)
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈+−| ρAoBoE |+−〉Bodx1dp1
) . (A.7)
Since Eq. (A.7) is the same as Eq. (A.5) and P (xB , pB) is proportion to
trAoE
(∫∞
−∞Bo〈+−| ρAoBoE |+−〉Bodx1dp1
)
, S(E|xB, pB) is identical in MC process
and TM process. The cases in the other new sub-protocols can be proved in the
same way.
In Fig. 2, because the state B2B1A2A1E is also a pure state, S(E) =
S(B2B1A2A1). Similarly, in Fig. 1(b), S(E) = S(B2B1A2A1). Because the modes
B2B1A2A1 are same to Figs. 1(b) and 2, S(E) is same. Therefore, IBE is same to
Figs. 1(b) and 2.
Appendix B. The Calculation of Eq. (5)
In Fig. 2, the corresponding covariance matrixes of EPR pairs of Alice and Bob are
ΓBob=
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1σz√
V 2 − 1σz V I
)
, ΓAlice=
(
VAI
√
V 2A − 1σz√
V 2A − 1σz VAI
)
. (B.1)
The two modes B1 and A1 are uncorrelated. The mode C1 is changed into the mode
Ain through the channel. Alice couples one mode of her EPR pair with the mode
Ain by the beam splitter TA. The action of the beam splitter TA is equivalent to a
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unitary transformation. When the mode Aout is sent back to Bob, the corresponding
covariance matrix of the modes B2B1A2A1 is
ΓB2B1A2A1=


VxB2 0 CxB2xB1 0 CxB2xA2 0 CxB2xA1 0
0 VpB2 0 CpB2pB1 0 CpB2pA2 0 CpB2pA1
CxB2xB1 0 V 0 CxB1xA2 0 0 0
0 CpB2pB1 0 V 0 CpB1pA2 0 0
CxB2xA2 0 CxB1xA2 0 VxA2 0 CA1A2 0
0 CpB2pA2 0 CpB1pA2 0 VpA2 0 −CA1A2
CxB2xA1 0 0 0 CA1A2 0 VA 0
0 CpB2pA1 0 0 0 −CA1A2 0 VA


, (B.2)
where the diagonal elements correspond to the variances of x and p quadratures of
the modes B2, B1, A2 and A1 in turn, and the nondiagonal elements correspond
to the covariances between modes. Note that the covariance between the modes
A1 and A2 is CA1A2 =
√
TA (V 2A − 1), which is irrelevant to the channels since the
mode A1 is only controlled by Alice and its values are random.
In the heterodyne detection, a vacuum state is introduced by the beam split-
ter. The corresponding covariance matrix of the modes B2B1A2A1 and the three
vacuum states C01, C02 and C03 is
ΓB2C01B1C02A2A1C03 =

VxB2 0 0 0 CxB2xB1 0 0 0 CxB2xA2 0 CxB2xA1 0 0 0
0 VpB2 0 0 0 CpB2pB1 0 0 0 CpB2pA2 0 CpB2pA1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CxB2xB1 0 0 0 V 0 0 0 CxB1xA2 0 0 0 0 0
0 CpB2pB1 0 0 0 V 0 0 0 CpB1pA2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CxB2xA2 0 0 0 CxB1xA2 0 0 0 VxA2 0 CA1A2 0 0 0
0 CpB2pA2 0 0 0 CpB1pA2 0 0 0 VpA2 0 −CA1A2 0 0
CxB2xA1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CA1A2 0 VA 0 0 0
0 CpB2pA1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −CA1A2 0 VA 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


.
(B.3)
By the unitary transformations of the three beam splitters, the modes
B2B1A2A1 are changed into the modes B2XB2PB1XB1PA2A1XA1P . Its corre-
sponding covariance matrix is ΓB2XB2PB1XB1PA2A1XA1P = [ΓBS ⊕ ΓBS ⊕ I ⊕
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ΓBS]ΓB2C01B1C02A2A1C03 [ΓBS ⊕ ΓBS ⊕ I⊕ ΓBS]T , where
ΓBS =


√
1
2
0
√
1
2
0
0
√
1
2
0
√
1
2
−
√
1
2
0
√
1
2
0
0 −
√
1
2
0
√
1
2


. (B.4)
Therefore, Eq. (5) is obtained, in which
γB2X=γB2P =
(
1+VxB2
2
0
0
1+VpB2
2
)
, γA2 =
(
VxA2 0
0 VpA2
)
,
C1 =
(
CxB2xB1
2
0
0
CpB2pB1
2
)
, C2 =

 CxB2xA2√2 0
0
CpB2pA2√
2

 ,
C3 =
(
CxB2xA1
2
0
0
CpB2pA1
2
)
, C4 =

 CxB1xA2√2 0
0
CpB1pA2√
2

 ,
C5=


√
TA(V 2A−1)
2
0
0 −
√
TA(V 2A−1)
2

 . (B.5)
Every element of Eq. (5) can be obtained by the measurement values in experi-
ment. For example, in the heterodyne detection on the mode B2, the x quadrature
value xB2X of the mode B2X and the p quadrature value pB2P of the mode B2P are
obtained. There are the following relations
xB2X =
√
1
2
(xB2 + x0), xB2P =
√
1
2
(x0 − xB2),
pB2X =
√
1
2
(pB2 + p0), pB2P =
√
1
2
(p0 − pB2), (B.6)
where xB2 , pB2 , x0 and p0 are the x and p quadratures of the mode B2 and the
vacuum state, respectively, pB2X is the p quadrature of the mode B2X and xB2P is
the x quadrature of the mode B2P . Then, we get
pB2X = −pB2P +
√
2p0,
xB2P = −xB2X +
√
2x0. (B.7)
Therefore, the variances of p and x quadratures of the modes B2X and B2P can be
calculated according to the measurement values xB2X and pB2P〈
p2B2X
〉
=
〈
p2B2P
〉− 2√2 〈pB2P p0〉+ 2 〈p20〉 = 〈p2B2P 〉 ,〈
x2B2P
〉
=
〈
x2B2X
〉− 2√2 〈xB2Xx0〉+ 2 〈x20〉 = 〈x2B2X 〉 . (B.8)
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Similarly, the covariances between modes can be calculated. For example,
C2 = diag (〈xB2XxA2〉 , 〈pB2XpA2〉)
= diag
(
〈xB2XxA2〉 ,
〈
(−pB2P +
√
2p0)pA2
〉)
= diag (〈xB2XxA2〉 , 〈−pB2P pA2〉) , (B.9)
where xA2 and pA2 are the measurement values of x and p quadratures of the mode
A2 which are obtained by randomly measuring the x and p quadratures of the mode
A2.
Appendix C. The Calculation of Eigenvalues
The corresponding covariance matrix Γ of a n-mode state has n eigenvalues λ′′i
for i = 1, ..., n where λ′′i is the function of the element α
′′
mn of Γ. The symplectic
invariants of the n-mode state {△n,j} for j = 1, ..., n are defined as42
△n,j=M2j(ΩΓ), (C.1)
where Ω = ⊕n1 iσy (σy standing for the y Pauli matrix) andM2j(ΩΓ) is the principal
minor of order 2j of the 2n× 2n matrix ΩΓ which is the sum of the determinants
of all the 2j × 2j submatrices of ΩΓ obtained by deleting 2n−2j rows and the
corresponding 2n−2j columns.42 There are n independent symplectic invariants
{△n,j} which are the function of the element α′′mn of Γ. In addition, there is a
relation42
△n,j=
∑
snj
∏
i∈snj
λ′′i
2
, (C.2)
where snj are the subsets of all the possible combinations of j integers within n
where j is smaller than or equal to n. Therefore, the symplectic eigenvalues λ′′i for
i = 1, ..., n are the solutions of the n order polynomial
zn− △n,1 zn−1+ △n,2 zn−2− △n,3 zn−3 + ... △n,n= 0. (C.3)
The solutions are denoted as z = (λ′′i )
2 = f2λ′′i
(α′′mn) for i = 1, ..., n which are the
function of the element α′′mn of the covariance matrix Γ. For n = 4, there are
f2λ′′
1,2
(α′′mn)=
△4,1
4
− 1
2
√
△
2
4,1
4
− 2△4,2
3
+Θ± 1
2
√√√√△24,1
2
− 4△4,2
3
−Θ−△
3
4,1−4△4,1△4,2+8△4,3
4
√
△
2
4,1
4
− 2△4,2
3
+Θ
,
f2λ′′
3,4
(α′′mn)=
△4,1
4
+
1
2
√
△
2
4,1
4
− 2△4,2
3
+Θ± 1
2
√√√√△24,1
2
− 4△4,2
3
−Θ+△
3
4,1−4△4,1△4,2+8△4,3
4
√
△
2
4,1
4
− 2△4,2
3
+Θ
,
(C.4)
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where
Θ =
2
1
3H
3J
+
J
3 · 2 13 ,
H =△24,2 −3 △4,1△4,3 +12 △4,4,
J =
(
L+
√
L2 − 4H3
) 1
3
,
L = 2 △34,2 −9 △4,1△4,2△4,3 +27 △24,3 +27 △24,1△4,4 −72 △4,2△4,4 . (C.5)
By a unitary transformation, ΓAB can be changed into Eq. (B.3),
i.e., diag(ΓB2B1A2A1 , I3). Therefore, the eigenvalues of ΓAB are λi =
fλ1,2,3,4 (αmn), 1, 1, 1, where fλ1,2,3,4(αmn) are the eigenvalues of ΓB2B1A2A1 cal-
culated according to Eq. (C.4). By the unitary of the beam splitter, there is
[I3 ⊕ ΓBS]TΓxB,pBB3B5A2A1XA1P [I3 ⊕ ΓBS] = diag(Γ
xB,pB
B3B5A2A1
, I), where ΓxB ,pBB3B5A2A1 is
the corresponding covariance matrix of a four-mode state. Thus, the eigenvalues of
ΓxB ,pBB3B5A2A1XA1P are λ
′
i = fλ′1,2,3,4(α
′
mn), 1, where fλ′1,2,3,4(α
′
mn) are the eigenvalues
of ΓxB,pBB3B5A2A1 calculated according to Eq. (C.4).
Appendix D. The Secret Key Rate of the Hom2
M
, Hom-HetM and
Het-HomM Protocols
In Fig. 2, because S(E) = S(B2B1A2A1) and the modes B2B1A2A1 are same to all
the new two-way sub-protocols, S(E) is same. Therefore, we only need to consider
the conditional entropy on Bob to calculate IBE .
In Hom2M protocol, Bob gets the variables xB1 and xB2 by homodyne detection
on the modes B1 and B2 and uses x
′
B = xB2 − kxB1 for postprocessing. This
procedure is equivalent to the one where Bob uses Γk to change the modes B1 and
B2 into B
′
3 and B
′
4. The corresponding covariance matrix of the system B
′
4B
′
3Ao is
ΓB′
4
B′
3
Ao = [Γk ⊕ I3] ΓB2B1Ao [Γk ⊕ I3]T , (D.1)
where ΓB2B1Ao is obtained by applying the unitary transformation [ΓBS⊕ΓBS⊕ I3]
to Eq. (5).
When Bob gets the x′B by measuring B
′
4, the state B
′
3AoE is a pure state, which
means S(E|x′B) = S(B′3Ao|x′B). Similar to Eq. (6), we get
S(E|x′B) =
4∑
i=1
G(λ′j), (D.2)
where λ′j is the symplectic eigenvalue of the corresponding covariance matrix Γ
x′B
B′
3
Ao
of the state B′3Ao conditioned on x
′
B. Γ
x′B
B′
3
Ao
is calculated from ΓB′
4
B′
3
Ao .
20,28
In Hom-HetM protocol, Bob gets the variable xB1 by homodyne detection on
B1 and gets the variables xB2X and pB2P by heterodyne detection on B2. Bob only
uses x′′B = xB2X − kxB1 for postprocessing. This procedure is equivalent to the
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one where Bob uses Γk to change the modes B2X and B1 into B
′′
3 and B
′′
4 . The
corresponding matrix of the state B′′4B
′′
3B2pAo is
ΓB′′
4
B′′
3
B2pAo = [Γk ⊕ I4]ΓB2XB1B2PAo [Γk ⊕ I4]T , (D.3)
where I4 = I3 ⊕ I and ΓB2XB1B2PAo is obtained by applying the unitary transfor-
mation [I⊕ I⊕ ΓBS ⊕ I3] to Eq. (5).
When Bob gets the variable x′′B by measuring B
′′
4 , the state B
′′
3B2pAoE is a pure
state, which means S(E|x′′B) = S(B′′3B2pAo|x′′B). Similar to Eq. (6), we can get
S(E|x′′B) =
5∑
i=1
G(λ′′j ), (D.4)
where λ′′j is the symplectic eigenvalue of the corresponding covariance matrix
Γ
x′′B
B′′
3
B2pAo
of the state B′′3B2pAo conditioned on x
′′
B . Γ
x′′B
B′′
3
B2pAo
is calculated from
ΓB′′
4
B′′
3
B2pAo .
20,28
In Het-HomM protocol, Bob gets the variables xB1X and pB1P by heterodyne
detection on B1 and gets the variable xB2 by homodyne detection on B2. Bob only
uses x′′′B = xB2 − kxB1X for postprocessing. This procedure is equivalent to the
one where Bob uses Γk to change the modes B1X and B2 into B
′′′
3 and B
′′′
4 . The
corresponding matrix of the state B′′′4 B
′′′
3 B1pAo is
ΓB′′′
4
B′′′
3
B1pAo = [Γk ⊕ I4]ΓB2B1XB1PAo [Γk ⊕ I4]T , (D.5)
where ΓB2B1XB1PAo is obtained by applying the unitary transformation [ΓBS⊕I4⊕I]
to Eq. (5).
When Bob gets the variable x′′′B by measuring B
′′′
4 , the state B
′′′
3 B1PAoE is a
pure state, which means S(E|x′′′B ) = S(B′′′3 B1PAo|x′′′B ). Similar to Eq. (6), we can
get
S(E|x′′′B ) =
5∑
i=1
G(λ′′′j ), (D.6)
where λ′′′j is the symplectic eigenvalue of the corresponding covariance matrix
Γ
x′′′B
B′′′
3
B1PAo
of the state B′′′3 B1PAo conditioned on x
′′′
B . Γ
x′′′B
B′′′
3
B1PAo
is calculated from
ΓB′′′
4
B′′′
3
B1PAo .
20,28
In addition, we can obtain that, in Hom2M protocol,
IBA =
1
2
log2
VA − TAVA + TAT1F + χ2
1− TA + TAT1F + χ2 , (D.7)
in Hom-HetM protocol,
IBA =
1
2
log2
1 + T1T2TAF + T2(VA − TAVA + χ2)
1 + T1T2TAF + T2(1− TA + χ2) , (D.8)
and in Het-HomM protocol,
IBA =
1
2
log2
VA − TAVA + TAT1(1 + F ) + χ2
1− TA + TAT1(1 + F ) + χ2 . (D.9)
According to Eq. (1), the secret key rate of above sub-protocols can be obtained.
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